Background
Something suspiciously resembling a double standard exists in US regulation of broadband access carriers. Incumbent local exchange carriers-ILECs-are required to open access to their networks for competing service providers, while cable television companies are not. Where did Congress and the FCC get it right? In the telco case, where open access is required, and there is a nascent competitive market for telephony and DSL services, or in the case of cable data networks, where consumers have no choice but to buy their service from the cable company's affiliated ISP? Or is disparity the best policy?
ILECs are indignant at the double standard. They say, impose the same standards on both pipelines. Either place the same burden on our competitors, or, better yet, free us from open access requirements, too. Cable companies, for their part, deny that their behavior is anti-competitive. They feel they deserve to be free to compete with the ILECs as best they can.
The FCC recognizes the dilemma of its stance on broadband open access. The Commission wants to promote investment, deployment, and free, market-driven TPRC 2000
Broadband Architectures 2 outcomes. But any open access requirements it imposes on broadband access carriers-whether justified or not-will discourage investment in infrastructure.
(Just how significant that discouragement to investment would be is not clear.)
On the other hand, if the Commission sits on the sidelines while market concentration grows, it will be much more difficult to undo damage that could have been prevented by early intervention. The stakes are high. Should the broadband pipeline market succumb to concentration, the content and on-line commerce markets could fall next. There are risks on either prong of the FCC's dilemma. FCC action or inaction could unwittingly undermine its goal of universal, competitive broadband local access.
For now, the FCC has chosen to sit back and watch. According to the FCC's Cable Services Bureau Chief Deborah Lathen, …The Commission has adopted a policy of vigilant restraint, refraining from mandating "open access" at this time, while closely monitoring for anticompetitive developments that may require intervention. Additionally, the Commission is also actively promoting the development of many broadband competitors--including wireless, satellite, cable, and telephone providers--by limiting regulatory burdens, by making more spectrum available, and by making spectrum use more flexible. Competition from multiple broadband providers is seen as the best way to prevent a monopoly by one provider. 1 The FCC's ultimate hope is that multiple pipelines into the home will make restrictions on any single pipeline unnecessary. In a market with two, or three, or perhaps more paths for broadband information into the home, facilities owners will presumably find it in their best interest to provide nondiscriminatory access to content and upstream access providers over their networks. At least that's the theory. But it assumes that multiple carriers will be in a position to compete for each customer's business. That may be the case in 1 Lathen [1999, 15] .
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Broadband Architectures 3 certain densely populated areas with terrain favorable to wireless broadband.
But it may not be the case for most consumers. 
Broadband Access Architectures
The problem of open access for broadband access networks depends in large part on where a subscriber's traffic first must contend with other subscribers' traffic for network resources. There are three locations where contention can first occur:
1. at a carrier aggregation point remote from the subscriber's location (a telephone company central office or a cable company head-end,)
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The reason that the point of first contention is likely to be the same location that open access becomes problematic is because the sharing of resources-in a network that was typically conceived to be a private network-raises challenges for network management. Whose customers get how much access to the networks resources, and when? Who sets the policies under which the traffic shares capacity? How does the carrier allocate the costs of network resources to the appropriate ISP? So long as the contention does not occur until after the traffic has entered the jurisdiction of the user's ISP, questions of fairness and compensation for traffic loads do not arise. But where a carrier must arbitrate among users of multiple ISPs, the carrier shoulders higher network management costs.
The first case-where contention occurs at the point-of-presence-is characteristic of DSL service, the second is typical of cable data services, and the third is associated with special cases in the provision of DSL.
The following sections describe these three possibilities, outlining how each architecture relates to the provisioning of open access services over broadband networks. We begin with the simpler DSL options, then proceed to the cable data option.
DSL Architectures
The standard DSL Architecture customer's data passes over the telco's data network, through the telco's data network, and then out onto the Internet, if necessary. The CLEC customer's data takes a similar path through the DSLAM and the CLEC's data network. The only difference between the two scenarios is that the CLEC customer's wiring takes a detour from the Central Office to the CLEC's equipment, which may be located either in a separate cage in the Central Office or in a nearby building. The problem is rather low-tech: DLC equipment is installed in small, outdoor metal cabinets at curbside. Space inside the cabinet is limited. To provide DSL service over the DLC system, the box must accommodate both the DLC subscriber's traffic could be sent directly to a network access point maintained by the appropriate ISP.) The IEEE group withdrew its charter and disbanded because of lack of support by the cable industry. The American cable industry, which felt that the IEEE group was not converging rapidly enough on a standard, decided to pursue its own IP-based standard. 5 At the time of this writing, the development of a European cable standard is in flux. The Digital Audio Visual Council (DAVIC) had been headed towards an ATM-like standard similar to IEEE 802.14, but DAVIC is reconsidering and may opt for more compatibility with DOCSIS. On broadband architectures, see Maxwell [1999] , Abe [2000] Azzam & Ransom [2000] , and Robert Russell, chair of 802.14, personal communications.
Internet
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Cable operators have a variety of options in network architecture. DOCSIS does not dictate the structure of the data network-it is principally a physical and MAC layer specification. Two classes of cable data network architecture have been common: bridged and routed architectures. In a bridged architecture, the entire cable system is connected together via bridges (roughly speaking, dumb routers that broadcast all incoming information on all output interfaces.) Simple bridged architectures were more common in the earliest deployments of cable data systems, but their limited scalability has led later system architects to opt for For outgoing packets, open access presents additional problems. In conventional routing schemes, packets are sent on a best path toward destination based solely on the destination address of the packet. Outgoing packets would be routed out of the cable network, regardless of which ISP's customers sent them. If alternate ISP customers are paying for premium handling of outgoing traffic, they will be unhappy that their traffic is being delivered as the cable company chooses. And the cable company might not be happy about forwarding traffic for other ISPs, unless it were being paid to do so.
There are several options for coaxing cable data networks to properly handle traffic for subscribers of other ISPs. Which option to choose depends on the capabilities of the routers in the cable operator's data network. One set of options is available if the cable network's routers are capable of policy routing (or policy-based routing.) Under policy routing, routing decisions can be based on any number of criteria, including the packet's source address, the type of data carried by the packet, the time of day, the level of congestion on the network, and so forth. A network that uses policy routing and specially maintained routing The options for managing tunnels include:
• Generic Routing Encapsulation (GRE)
• Layer 2 Tunneling Protocol (L2TP)
• Multiprotocol Label Switching (MPLS)
• Native IP implementation
The Generic Routing Encapsulation is a tunneling protocol that can be used to forward a payload packet over an arbitrary delivery protocol. In the case of open access Internet service, both the payload and the delivery protocols are IP, and the purpose of the tunneling is to override the standard routing protocols. GRE requires special software in the client machine and in the router at the far end of the tunnel.
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Layer 2 Tunneling Protocol provides a point-to-point connection over a public network. L2TP simulates a layer 2 (data link) connection between two points by encapsulating layer 2 data in a tunnel constructed at layer 3, the network level.
L2TP requires implementations for the client and end-point router, only.
Windows 2000 includes an L2TP implementation. 
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Before we brush off spectrum unbundling, however, we should note that it would be a simple solution for the problem, if only spectrum for data were not in such short supply on cable systems. In the future, when fiber optics push out to the home and ease the spectrum bottleneck, one can imagine optical spectrum or lambda-unbundling for competitive service providers.
Though it is currently impractical, spectrum unbundling has a major advantage over all other open access architectures: it isolates the traffic of each ISP and allows each to manage the traffic of its own customers. The alternatives discussed here all create complicated network management problems for facilities owners and alternate ISPs. We discuss the problem in greater detail Consumers who connect to the Internet via a connection-oriented scheme, like PPP, are usually assigned an IP address upon establishing a connection.
Customers who connect over a bridged or routed LAN typically obtain an IP address via the Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP.) In either case, the ISP must manage the IP numbers it administers as well as the mechanisms for assigning IP addresses to users. 10 Huston [1999] .
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• Directory Services: The most commonly used directory service is the Domain Name Service (DNS,) which translates human-readable (or nearly human-readable) addresses like www.tprc.org into a 32-bit binary IP addresses used by computers, such as 10001101110100111100101100010101.
In the future, consumers will require simplified access to directory services required for telephony, conferencing, and other higher-level services marketed by ISPs.
Also, if an ISP customer has registered a domain name, the ISP can perform the procedures necessary for maintaining information about the domain in the DNS hierarchy.
• Outgoing packet routing and connectivity: When a user transmits requests or data to a host computer, the ISP's network must direct the packet to the edge of its network and pass it to another provider that agrees to take traffic destined for the remote location. To forward packets to their destination optimally, the ISP must insure that its routers have up-to-date information about the best path to arbitrary points on the Internet.
An ISP purchases or negotiates for services from other carriers on behalf of its customers. Low-tier ISPs purchase transit on behalf of their customers from higher-tier ISPs; high-tier ISPs provide transit, peering and interconnection services for their customers.
• Incoming packet routing and connectivity: Packets destined for a user from remote sites will be directed to the outside edge of the ISP's network. From there, the ISP is responsible for directing the packet to the user's computer.
• Access: All broadband access companies provide equipment at their end of the connection. They may also provide the customer premises equipment, and may provide the physical connection. Traditional dial-up ISPs and DSL providers using unbundled network elements supply only modem banks at • Outgoing mail services: To send email, customers of an ISP must be able to connect to outgoing email servers, typically running the Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP.) The ISP's mail servers accept mail from the user's machine, then forwards mail to the destination email host.
• Mail list services: ISPs may offer customers mailing list services, including the ability to manage a mailing list.
• Shell access: Some users find shell access to ISP servers convenient for communication or web site management.
• Usenet news: Most ISPs provide customers with access to news servers connected to Usenet news feeds using the Network News Transfer Protocol TPRC 2000
Broadband Architectures 20 (NNTP.) In addition to the news feed, the ISP maintains a server from which customers can retrieve recent postings or make postings to Usenet.
• Caching: Content caching by ISPs could be considered a fundamental network service, since the decision to stage content closer to users is ultimately an engineering decision. But currently, caching is almost exclusively tied to specific applications, in particular, the web. In the future, other forms of content may be pushed near the edge of the network to hit the optimum mixture of cost and performance. Frequently requested web content that is cached locally at an ISPs both minimizes traffic on the ISPs backbone connection and shortens the response time for web users. If managed properly, caching benefits both the ISP and the user.
• Web hosting: ISPs may provide web hosting or virtual web hosting services for customers.
III. Customer Relations
• Tech Support: Customers expect their ISPs to provide help when they experience difficulty accessing online services.
• Billing & Accounting: With the exception of advertiser-supported Internet access, vendors of Internet access monitor and bill for their subscribers' use of resources.
• Security & Confidentiality: Technically, security can be implemented in the network infrastructure or by individual applications. ISPs maintain at least minimal levels of security, to prevent unauthorized users from accessing subscribers' email, hacking users' web sites. ISPs may offer greater levels of security for customers engaged in e-commerce.
How you divide up the bundle of traditional ISP services depends on marketing decisions as well as details of the access network architecture. In some instances, TPRC 2000
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ISPs and access carriers can farm out responsibilities to each other.
Broadband Business Plans: Who does what?
If a cable company opens its network to competing ISPs, the ISP and the cable operator will be entering into a joint relationship with the ISP's customers. The ISP and the cable operator will be responsible for various elements of the service profile offered to subscribers. Exactly which services are to be performed by which party is for the ISP and the cable operator to determine. As illustrated in the following tables, there are dozens of decisions to be made about who provides what services. (Cells with more than one option indicate that a choice must be made.) Some of these decisions may be determined by technical constraints, but most are amenable to business analysis by the two parties, who can decide the most attractive solution.
First, the fundamental network and internetworking services: The only service listed in the tables that must be performed by the cable operator is basic access. The only services that must be performed by the ISP is the TPRC 2000
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issuance of an IP number (even if done through the cable ops hardware) and incoming mail queuing. There are many opportunities here for the cable operator to bite off pieces of the value-added by an ISP. The cable operator could benefit both politically and financially through these open access arrangements.
The cable operator earns points from regulators for opening up its network, and it earns money from competitive ISPs for performing services on their behalf.
Indeed, a competitive cable operator has announced that it will offer open access to its overbuilds because open access looks like a money-making proposition.
Colorado-based WideOpenWest hopes soon to be awarded franchises for cable systems in Denver and Boulder, Colorado. True, WideOpenWest will be building new cable plant, so it will not be limited by old cable data equipment.
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Integrators, SLAs & Verification
The simple who-does-what tables in the previous section included 8 services that could be offered by more than one provider. At a minimum, that means that consumers might have to choose among at least 256 combinations of services and service providers. Such a menu would be daunting to industry experts, but it would be even more intimidating to the average Internet user. What can be done to help subscribers decide what choices to make in broadband access? Eli Noam's [1994] suggestion that "integrators" step in to make technically complicated decisions for consumers in highly competitive markets seems to make sense here. Consumers would hire integrators to serve as agents to contract for the best service at the best price and shield the consumer from the messy economic and technical details of how things get done.
In addition to finding the right product mix at the right price, integrators could also provide consumers with tools to assess the quality of the services they are should not take much interference to effect a change in user behavior. The result would be the achievement in practice of a theoretical paradox first formulated by Yogi Berra: "Nobody goes to that site anymore. It's too crowded."
Since the strategic manipulation of network performance need not be flagrant to be effective, it would be unwise to rely on human judgment to determine if some network administrators are favoring some content over other content on a network. Instead, an objective measure of the performance of the network is necessary. Monitoring the performance of the network would not only indicate if discrimination by content is taking place-it would also alert consumers when 11 Backover [2000] .
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Integrators could install monitoring agent software on customers machines, measure and performance of the network, and aggregate the data to reveal any suspicious patterns. Consumers would not need to know-nor would they be interested in knowing-all the details measured by their integrators' network performance monitors. A simple thumbs-up or thumbs-down would indicate to the average consumer enough information about whether to get angry at the cable company, the ISP, or the kids down the street running Gnutella.
Conclusion:
In ruling against the city of Portland's open access requirements, the US 9 To the extent @Home is a conventional ISP, its activities are one of an information service. However, to the extent that @Home provides its subscribers Internet transmission over its cable broadband facility, it is providing a telecommunications service as defined in the Communications Act." 13 The survey of ISP service profiles in this paper suggests that it may be no easier for the law to separate broadband access telecommunications services from broadband information services as it is to separate a browser from an operating system. Much of the temptation to exclude other information providers has to do with a fixation on content. The mania for content may be self-defeating, however.
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Industry players are acting as though content is the only market in which one can make money. Cable operators are jealously guarding their ability to control all forms of content flowing through their networks; pure DSL players are making deals with content providers to try and increase the value they can present to their subscribers. But carriers and technology companies have tried to move into content before, without much success. One sure way to improve your chances in the content market is to exclude the competition from the pipeline, but that may not be a wise long-term corporate strategy. It is certainly not in the public interest.
Besides, what's wrong with being a carrier? It might not be so bad being a carrier in a commodity bandwidth market, so long as the growth in consumption of bandwidth is fast enough. If the price elasticity of demand for bandwidth is significantly greater than one, and if demand grows exponentially, then carrier revenues will grow steadily, despite dropping prices for bandwidth.
14 If that is the case, a wise posture for a broadband access carrier might be to open up network to any and all content creators, maximize the volume of traffic flowing over the access pipeline, and watch the revenues flow.
Finally, the broad range of possible combinations of services and service providers suggests that policy makers would benefit from a more complex analysis of broadband market structure. The economic and engineering linkages among the many services that make up broadband must be explored more thoroughly. Conclusions drawn by analyzing service markets in isolation will not resolve the larger policy issues driving the open access debate.
14 See Lanning, O'Donnell & Neuman [2000] for an elaboration of this argument.
